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Abstract. This paper describes TAPI, an offline scheme intended for general
Internet-based micropayments. TAPI, which extends and combines concepts from
the KeyNote Microchecks and OTPCoins architectures, encodes risk management
rules in bank-issued users’ credentials which are in turn used to acquire small-
valued payment tokens. The scheme has very low transaction overhead and can
be tuned to use different risk strategies for different environments and clients.
1 Introduction
Traditional electronic payment systems impose a low bound on the value of each
transaction due to the associated processing and clearing overhead. For small-value
transactions, this overhead dominates the value of the transaction itself, making the use
of such a system uneconomical. Various schemes have been proposed, aiming to reduce
overheads so as to handle payments of fractions of a cent. These systems must cope with
problems of scale, risk, and trust. It is important to have mechanisms that can scale to
millions of transactions while maintaining acceptable levels of risk.
However, cryptographic and other computational operations have non-negligible
cost. Thus, we need to minimize the crypto operations by aggregating them in larger
transactions. Our observation is that we can take advantage of any locality of reference
exhibited by micropayments, i.e., a user paying for a service from a web site is more
likely to purchase additional services from the same site. For applications where this
holds, we can amortize the cost of many micropayments over a larger payment.
We present a mechanism that allows multiple partial charges against a payment
authorization. By splitting a micropayment transaction into a number of partial transac-
tions (minipayments) for smaller amounts, up to the amount of the original micropay-
ment, we can accommodate multiple purchases within the original (single) transaction.
Thus, we spread the cost of the transaction over a number of distinct purchases. A simi-
lar approach is being used by some vendors: multiple small credit card transactions are
aggregated and presented as a single transaction to the credit card company. Typically,
special agreements that cover liability and specify dispute handling policies need to be
in place before this can be used. We built a system where dispute handling can eas-
ily be managed, i.e., the merchant or the user can prove (or disprove) that a particular
minipayment occurred, and thus limit the exposure to fraud.
We discuss a case study involving per-packet charging in a wireless network. In Sec-
tion 2, we describe the background for our case study and arrive at the requirements for
the charging scheme. We then describe the key features of our partial micropayment ar-
chitecture by presenting a detailed example, namely a microcheck payment framework
that is based on the KeyNote [1] trust-management system and a mechanism for making
partial payments from a single microcheck. We briefly discuss our implementation in
Section 3, and give an overview of related work in Section 4.
1.1 Motivation
The massive reduction in cost of wireless LAN (WiFi) base-stations has resulted in
the gradual deployment of wireless LANs in public places by commercial operators,
who want to charge for access. In most existing installations, the user must establish
credit with the site operator (usually through a Web portal) before being allowed access
to the network. As the density of WiFi coverage increases, the requirement for separate
authentication with each provider becomes more onerous. Ideally, the user should be
able to move between WiFi networks and access the Internet with authentication and
payment done automatically. The rigidity of current payment methods (including the
inability of the payment infrastructure to handle small payments) forces the network
operators to charge for access in large time slots (e.g., on a daily or weekly basis). The
use of micropayments would allow the operator to be much more flexible. For example,
the operator may wish to charge for each packet sent or received by the user.
Even if operators do not charge real money for the services offered, it is sometimes
desirable to have some type of accountability, to detect infrastructure abusers (to avoid
the “tragedy of the commons”). Such schemes still depend on some type of user reg-
istration and accounting; the missing part is the translation to the real-world concepts
(i.e., money). A micropayment scheme with “play” money can be used to provide this
accountability. In order to be able to perform this type of charging, we need a system
that satisfies the following requirements: First, it must be able to handle very small pay-
ments. Second, it should not require a user-initiated login procedure; instead, be able to
receive payment dynamically. Third, it should not require on-line authentication with
the user’s credit institution in order to minimize connection overhead and accommodate
situations where the user’s credit institution is temporarily inaccessible.
To satisfy these requirements, we employ two different techniques: (a) The KeyNote
trust-management System that establishes trust between the user, the service provider
and the user’s credit institution, using the architecture we originally described in [2],
and (b) we introduce the concept of OTP Coins that allow single microchecks to be
broken into smaller payment increments. We present these two techniques in detail.
1.2 KeyNote Microchecks
The micropayments system introduced in [2] forms the basis of our approach. The
general architecture of this microbilling system is shown in Figure 1. We consider an
environment where Merchants and Payers sign up for service with a Provisioning Agent
(PA). Merchants interact with Payers through the Merchant Payment Processor (MPP).
The Clearing and Settlement Center (CSC) for reconciling transactions may be a sepa-







Fig. 1. Microbilling architecture diagram. We give the generic terms for each component,
and in parentheses the corresponding players. Arrows represent communication between
two parties: Provisioning issues credentials to Payers and Merchants; these communicate to
complete transactions; Merchants send transaction information to Clearing, which verifies
the transaction and posts the necessary credits/charges or arranges money transfers. Pro-
visioning and Clearing exchange status information about Payer and Merchant accounts.
The PA issues KeyNote [1] credentials to Payers and Merchants, that describe the
conditions under which a Payer is allowed to perform a transaction, and the fact that a
Merchant is authorized to participate in a transaction. When a Payer wants to buy some-
thing from a Merchant, the Merchant encodes the details of the proposed transaction
into an offer, which is sent to the Payer. To proceed, the Payer issues to the Merchant a
microcheck for this offer. The microchecks are encoded as KeyNote credentials that au-
thorize payment for a specific transaction. This credential is effectively a check signed
by the Payer and payable to the Merchant. The conditions under which this check is
valid match the Merchant’s offer. Part of the offer is a nonce, which maps payments to
specific transactions and prevents double-depositing of microchecks by the Merchant.
To determine whether he will be paid, the Merchant passes the offer description and
the Payer’s key along with the Merchant’s policy (that identifies the PA key), the Payer
credential (signed by the PA) and the microchecks credential (signed by the Payer) to
his local KeyNote compliance checker. If the compliance checker authorizes the trans-
action, the Merchant is guaranteed that Provisioning will allow payment.
If the transaction is approved, the Merchant stores a copy of the microcheck along
with the payer credential and associated offer details for later settlement. Otherwise,
depending on their network connectivity, either the Payer or the Merchant can request
a transaction-specific credential that can be used to authorize the transaction. This ap-
proach, if implemented transparently and automatically, provides a continuum between
online and offline transactions tuned to the specific risk and operational conditions.
Periodically, the Merchant will ‘deposit’ the microchecks and associated transaction
details to the CSC, which may or may not be run by the same entity as the PA, but
must have the proper authorization to transmit billing and payment records to the PA
for the customers. The CSC receives payment records from the various Merchants;
these records consist of the Offer, the KeyNote microcheck, and the credential from
the payer sent in response. In order to verify a microcheck, the CSC goes through the
same procedure as the Merchant did when accepting the microcheck. If the KeyNote
compliance checker approves, the check is accepted and the account balances adjusted.
The main advantage of this architecture is the ability to encode risk management
rules for micropayments in user credentials. Other electronic systems have focused on
preventing fraud and failure, rather than on managing it. As prevention mechanisms are
often too expensive for micropayments, risk management seems particularly attractive.
1.3 OTP Coins
Electronic coins based on One Time Passwords (OTP) are another fundamental as-
pect of our approach. While the microchecks manage the risks of single transactions,
OTP coins allow the cost of a microcheck to be distributed even more thinly, effectively
making it possible to divide a microcheck transaction into hundreds of smaller, partial
transactions. This approach is especially suitable for paying for access time, e-content,
or other kinds of “continuous” goods, i.e., goods that can be sold by some measure.
The basic approach, without microchecks, was outlined in [3]: an OPIE [4] OTP
account was sent to the Client, who used the passwords to pay for wireless Internet
access. The system was based on the IEEE 802.1x protocol, running OPIE over TLS.
When combined with microchecks, the Merchant spells out the OTP terms in the of-
fer, e.g., it might state he provides wireless Internet access time at $0.001 per 5 seconds
when bought in lots of 100 5 second units. That is, he offers 100 pieces of 5 second
access time units for the price of $0.1. If the Client accepts the offer, she generates a
random number H100, calculates a hash function over it 100 times, forming a reverse
hash chain H100, H99, ..., H1, H0, where Hi = hash(Hi+1), and embeds the result H0
into the microcheck she sends to the Merchant. The Merchant stores the hash value H0
(called Hcheck) along with the number of remaining valid tokens, 100. At this point, the
Merchant has sold to the Client 100 OTP coins, only valid with that Merchant. However,
the construction allows the Client to be charged only for the actual amount spent.
When the Client wants to use the coins, she sends the next hash value to the Mer-
chant. That is, she first sends H1, then H2, etc. The Merchant checks that the received
hash value gives the previously stored value, i.e., that Hstored = hash(Hreceived). If
so, she decrements the number of remaining valid tokens, and stores the new received
value. Thus, we have established a convention where a single OTP password repre-
sents the value for a certain commodity, e.g., for 5 seconds of access time. Once the
commodity has been used up, the Merchant asks for the next token, to continue service.
Once the Client has used all coins or stops using more coins, the Merchant pos-
sesses a hash value HN where N is the number of coins used. When he deposits the
microcheck to the CSC, he also sends these numbers. The CSC computes Hcheck =
hash
N(HN ) and compares this to the number stored in the microcheck. If they match,
it can be certain that the Client has indeed bought N units of the good.
2 Architecture
We describe the TAPI architecture through an example use in pay-per-use 802.11
access. We then give a brief security analysis of our architecture.
2.1 Example Usage Scenario
As an example, we show how the system can be adapted to a public wireless In-
ternet access using Wireless LANs. We begin with a client that has signed up with an
acceptable Provisioning agent. Here, access points subsume the role of the Merchant
and users play the role of the Payer. As a result of this registration process (which hap-
pens offline), the user is issued with a clearing check, signed with the PA’s public key:
Authorizer: PA KEY
Licensees: PAYER KEY
Conditions: app domain == "Internet Access" &&
currency == "USD" &&
&amount < 2.51 && date < "20031231" -> "true";
Signature: ...
Wireless LAN Authentication The IEEE 802.1x standard [5] defines a means to
authenticate clients in an Ethernet-like network, e.g., it allows authenticating devices
starting to use WLAN or a corporate LAN for Internet access. In practice, the standard
defines how to run the IETF standard Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [6]
over raw Ethernet frames. The encapsulation is called EAP over LAN (EAPoL) [5].
Since we use the standard EAP protocol, it is possible to use any or all of its sub-
protocols. However, since neither EAP or EAPoL provide any cryptographic protection
themselves, the security of the system depends on the security of the underlying net-
work and on the properties of the EAP subprotocol. Thus, the risks and the protections
must be matched to provide the desired level of security.
When 802.1x is used, there are two kinds of client hosts: authenticated and unau-
thenticated. In a wired LAN, the clients are usually distinguished based on the port: a
physical port is either authenticated or not. In a shared medium, e.g., Wireless LAN
(WLAN), the distinction is usually based on the Layer 2 addresses. It may be possible
to falsify or “steal” a MAC address, depending on the actual implementation. In the
case of public WLAN, where no encryption is used, the only protection is the relative
difficulty of using a MAC address at the same time another client is using it.
Buying OTP coins Whenever a new client host wants to join a LAN that uses IEEE
802.1x, the access-point attempts to run EAPoL. The status of the client is kept unau-
thenticated as long as the client fails to authenticate through EAPoL. In our case, we
provide unauthenticated clients limited access so that they can buy OTP coins, used for
the actual EAPoL level authentication (see below). That is, any unauthenticated client
is served (via DHCP) a private IP address. This address can be used only locally.
The client uses the MPP protocol to purchase a pile of OTP coins. In the simplest
case (and lacking any special-purpose protocol for purchasing coins), a simple web
interface can be used with the user. When the user contacts the captive portal, he sees a
web page that encodes the details of the Merchant offer, e.g.:
merchant = "ADK’S WIRELESS"
currency = "USD"
product = "Internet Access"
date = "20020916"
packets per coin = "100"
coins per dollar = "10000"
amount = "2"
nonce = "eb2c3dfc860dde9a"
The user examines the details of the request and, if acceptable, authorizes a payment
to the merchant by issuing the appropriate KeyNote microcheck:
Authorizer: PAYER KEY
Licensees: "ADK’s Internet"
Conditions: app domain == "Internet Access" &&
currency == "USD" && amount == "2" &&
packets per coin == "100" &&
coins per dollar == "10000" &&
first coin == "c637bf92f9f371dfa09\
59bc467d04b91c2ea1b29" &&
nonce == "eb2c3dfc860dde9a" &&
date == "20001227" -> "true";
Signature: ...
The microcheck also contains the value for the first OTP Coin. This coin is not actu-
ally used, but serves as the beginning of the OTP chain. The next time the client needs to
authorize a payment, she will use the next coin in the chain, i.e., “310b86e0b62b82856-
2fc91c7be5380a992b2786a”.The user sends this microcheck and its guaranteeing check,
issued by the PA, to the access point. The latter verifies the integrity of the credentials
and determines (by invoking KeyNote) whether the CSC will honor the payment terms.
Using OTP coins Once the Client has acquired a set of OTP coins, she runs the
standard 802.1x EAPoL protocol with the local access point. The access point requests
a user identifier from the client, who answers with a string identifying the microcheck
used for buying the OTP coins, and the merchant the coins where bought from. The
access point then contacts the back-end authenticator (the Merchant). The microcheck
fingerprint indicates the correct unused OTP coin pile.
Once the back-end authenticator receives the identity response, it checks the OTP
coin pile and sends an OPIE request, requesting for the next unused OPIE password,
i.e., OTP coin. The Client responds with the next unused coin, Hi+1. The back-end
authenticator checks the coin, records it as used, and replies with an EAP SUCCESS
message. As the access point receives the EAP SUCCESS message from the back-
end authenticator, it changes the status of the client into authenticated, and passes the
message to the client. When the client receives the SUCCESS message, she releases her
current IP address and requests a new one with DHCP. Since she is now authenticated,
she gets a new IP address that she can use to communicate with the outside world.
Alternatively, the client could have received a valid IP address which was appropriately
filtered by the access point; on success, the relevant filters are simply removed.
Before the OTP coin is used up, the back-end authenticator sends a new OPIE re-
quest to the client. If the client wants to continue, she replies with the next OTP coin.
On the other hand, if the client does not want to continue access for any reason, she
simply does not respond to the request. Thus, if the client goes off-line, the access point
changes the status of the client’s MAC address into unauthenticated.
Clearing Periodically, the access point provides all these microchecks along with
the related transaction records to the CSC, which uses this information to verify the
transaction and charge/credit the relevant accounts. The user’s device (laptop, PDA,
etc.) may also keep a record of all transactions, which can be used in case of a charge
dispute. CSCs communicate with PAs to indicate the status of Payers’ and Merchants’
accounts. Part of the transaction records include the last OTP coin received from a
user, and its serial number. The CSC can verify its validity, by repeatedly hashing it the
appropriate number of times and comparing the result with the initial OTP coin included
in the microcheck. Thus, the CSC can respectively debit the Merchant’s account and
credit the Payer’s account for the appropriate amount. In case of dispute, the exact usage
can be determined by verifying the credentials and the OTP coin chain. Assuming the
underlying cryptography is not broken, the results are non-repudiable.
2.2 Security Analysis
The security of the system can be broken into two parts: one that relates to the secu-
rity at the network level, and one that refers to the security of the payment mechanisms.
WLAN security Wireless LANs are known to be notoriously insecure. However,
their insecurity depends heavily in the way they are used. In our example case, where
WLAN is used for providing public Internet access, the operator is mainly interested
in collecting the access fees, while the clients are interested in getting the service they
pay for. Other security concerns that the users may have (e.g. privacy) can be taken care
of at an upper layer, and fall beyond the scope of this paper. Consequently, the main
threats we are interested in are: (a) someone gaining access without paying, and (b)
someone paying but not gaining access. Naturally, these threats may occur at the same
time, through an attacker “stealing” access that another user has paid for.
Thus, it is certainly possible for an attacker to cause an authenticated client to dis-
connect from the network, and start using its MAC address. However, the access point
is likely to detect the event and may require immediate re-authentication as the MAC
address re-connects to the network. If the value of the OTP coins is low enough, e.g.,
just a few seconds of access time, the gain for the potential attacker is small. Finally, it
should be straightforward to detect an attacker that repeatedly steals MAC addresses.
A more powerful attacker can set up a phony access point. If he lures other clients
to send OTP coins to it, he can then use these coins to pay towards the real access point,
effectively riding free. The victim clients are unlikely to notice anything, since they
still get the service they expect. The real access point may not notice anything either,
depending on its sophistication. While this attack can be made harder, e.g., by including
the Client’s MAC address in the microchecks, the simple nature of the OTP coins makes
it impossible to block the attack altogether. However, given the current status of WLAN
deployment, the cost of the attack compared to the benefits gained seems to be high
enough to render the attack academic. For proper security, either the OTP coins must
be replaced with something more sophisticated (and costly), or the underlying network
must be secured. The additional cost should be evaluated against the expected risk and
cost of fraud, and implemented only if economically viable.
Payment Framework Security When dealing with electronic payments we must
ensure that fraudulent transactions cannot take place, e.g., the merchant should not be
able to forge an OTP coin, nor should the user be able to deny that she has spent one.
The scheme requires that we select a non-reversible hash function. Thus, the mer-
chant can verify that Hn−1 was derived from Hn, but is unable to produce Hn−1 given
Hn. Similarly, if the client sends a number other than Hn−1, the merchant will detect
that and revoke the service. Similarly, if the merchant produces Hn−1, the client cannot
claim that she has not sent it. An extensive discussion of the security of the KeyNote
microcheck architecture may be found in [7]. A key observation is that the low value of
the checks and the need for light-weight verification mechanisms favor the use of cre-
dential expiration (with short lifetimes) over the use of a more heavyweight revocation
mechanism such as credential revocation lists.
3 Implementation
We have implemented the IEEE 802.1x protocol and the OTP coins in the FreeBSD
operating system [3]. Our initial performance measurements indicate that the effect on
payload performance is negligible: a typical EAPoL transaction is performed in less
than two seconds, making it possible to support re-authentication every 5-10 seconds.
Our 802.1x implementation consists of kernel code that implements the basic fram-
ing functions for the authentication protocol, plus a number of user level programs. The
user-level programs implement the individual EAP subprotocols, and in particular the
EAP OTP authenticator and supporting modules. These rely on a small new library,
libeap. They also utilize the libskey library present in FreeBSD. To make it easy to buy
OTP coins, we use a captive portal to allow users to download the 802.1x and EAP OTP
implementations. Our MAC filter module forward to a web server packets arriving from
unauthenticated users. Thus, it is possible to create a situation where the only services
provided to an unauthenticated client are DHCP and the captive web server.
We are currently working on implementing the full-fledged MPP protocol on top
of EAP, without the need for a captive portal. Users can specify their payment poli-
cies using KeyNote (or some other front-end mechanism, which is then translated to
KeyNote). On receipt of an offer from an access point, KeyNote is called to determine
whether the terms are acceptable. If so, a microcheck is automatically issued, and the
necessary OTP coins are generated and used without user interaction. If the offer is not
acceptable, the user is notified and presented with the offer.
4 Related Work
IEEE 802.1x Security IEEE 802.1x [5] is a forthcoming standard for authenticating
and authorizing users in Ethernet like local area network (LAN) environments. It is
primarily meant to secure switched Ethernet wireline networks and IEEE 802.11 based
WLANs. In the typical usage scenarios, the network requires user authentication before
any other traffic is allowed, i.e., even before the client is assigned an IP address. This
allows corporations to strictly control access to their networks. It is important to note
that 802.1x implements only authentication and MAC address based access control.
Since MAC spoofing is fairly easy, the resulting system may not be secure enough.
[8] argues that 802.1x security is flawed since it does not provide per-packet in-
tegrity and authenticity. Depending on the settings, this may allow session hijacking,
enabling an attacker to take over a MAC address that belongs to a legitimate, authen-
ticated user. In a shared medium such as 802.11, authentication should be tightly inte-
grated with a link-level integrity system using different session keys for different clients.
Electronic Cash and Micropayments NetBill [9] is a transactional payment proto-
col with many advanced features (atomicity, group membership, pseudonyms, etc.) that
requires communication with the NetBill server for each transaction, thus exhibiting the
same drawback with respect to micropayments as the simpler online protocols already
mentioned. Other general payment protocols [10–12] suffer the same problem.
Digital cash-based systems (e.g., [13]) do not directly address the issue of double-
spending (fraud). Some e-cash systems use online checking, thus negating the off-line
operation capability. Others rely on detection after the fact. This drawback is manifest
in several micropayment protocols [14–17]. While double-spending is a problem in all
off-line systems, none of these protocols address the issue of risk management.
NetCents [18] and Millicent [19] are scrip-based off-line-friendly micropayment
protocols. As the monetary unit used in these protocols is vendor-specific, double-
spending is made difficult. A hidden assumption is that merchants have “total informa-
tion”. If there are many points of sale, continuous communication and synchronization
is required between the different points, negating the benefits of off-line operation.
MiniPay [20] was developed primarily for use with a web browser, with a lot of ef-
fort gone into the user interface aspect. Risk management is implemented as a decision
to perform an online check with the billing server based on the total spending by the
customer that day, and some parameter set by the merchant. The billing provider cannot
customize the risk-management parameters per-customer or per-merchant. Fileteller [7]
uses a scheme similar to ours for buying and selling network-based storage.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
We presented TAPI, a simple offline electronic payment scheme intended for gen-
eral Internet-based micropayments. TAPIallows multiple partial charges on a single
payment authorization by splitting a micropayment transaction into a number of mini-
payments for smaller amounts (totaling the amount of the original micropayment), thus
accommodating multiple purchases within the original transaction.
To demonstrate our design in practice, we implemented the IEEE 802.1x protocol
along with the OTP coins in the FreeBSD operating system. Our case study involved
per-packet charging in a wireless network. Initial performance measurements indicated
that the effect on payload performance was negligible and that the typical EAPoL trans-
action takes less than 2 seconds on average. We are in the process of implementing the
full-fledged MPP protocol on top of EAP, without the need for a captive portal.
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